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ARTICLES
THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM: A SYMPOSIUM
AN INTRODUCTION
Marshall J. Breger*
It is a pleasure to introduce this Symposium which was inspired by a
conference on the future of Jerusalem held on October 24, 1995 at the
Columbus School of Law of The Catholic University of America. No one
could participate in that conference without reflecting that tensions over
Jerusalem mirror the reality of a city where competing and exclusive
claims of religion and politics overlap in ways seen in few other places in
the world.
For medieval Christians, Jerusalem was the umbilicus mundi-the na-
vel of the world-and indeed, for centuries, European maps of the world
used Jerusalem as their center. The City has been the focus of Christian
pilgrims since the fourth century. It contains the reputed sites of the cru-
cifixion, burial, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, including the Church of
the Holy Sepulchre, the churches marking the stations of the cross along
the Via Dolorosa, the Garden of Gethsemane, and the Church of the As-
cension. The City, moreover, has been the underlying metaphor for the
Christian notion of heavenly Jerusalem-where man lives out of time in
God's good and fulsome grace.
For Jews, Jerusalem is the "mountain of the Lord," the very core of the
Jewish people for 3,000 years. Indeed, the mishnah tells us that the
shechina, the divine presence, has never left the Western Wall. It is the
symbol of both spiritual and national revival. The Hatikvah, the Jewish
national anthem, speaks of the yearning for the "return to Zion and Jeru-
salem." In the daily prayers, three times a day, the religious Jew entreats
the Lord to "return in mercy to thy city Jerusalem."
Throughout history Jerusalem has been the center of Jewish conscious-
ness. In medieval times, elderly Jews traveled to Jerusalem to be buried
* Visiting Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America. Parts of this introduction are drawn from an essay entitled, Religion and the
Politics of Jerusalem in the June 1996 issue of the Journal of International Affairs.
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in its hallowed ground. Throughout the centuries they came to live in
spiritual piety. By 1844, they constituted the largest single religious group
in the City. In the 1870s, they were an absolute majority, and have re-
mained so ever since.
For Jews, then, Jerusalem is not a city that encompasses holy places.
Rather it is the earthly city itself that is holy, both the land and, as the
former Chief Rabbi Kook tells us, even the air. Jerusalem, then, is synon-
ymous with Judaism's entrenchment in the land of Israel. It is the very
center of that entrenchment. For Jews, political control over the part of
Jerusalem that it deems holy is intrinsic to its holiness. The religion itself
"requires its political control as the capital of the Jewish
Commonwealth."1
At the same time, as Professor Werblowsky has underscored, "[t]he
sanctity of Jerusalem in Islam is a fact."2 It is the original direction for
Moslem prayer, 'ula al-qublatheyn, and the al-mi'radj haqq, the place
from which the Prophet ascended (some say in a winged mount) to heav-
enly spheres. It is, moreover, the place that in Moslem tradition those
eschatological events harkening the end of the world will commence.
Those who try to suggest that al-Quds is less holy to Islam than to Juda-
ism simply are incorrect. The construction of comparative hierarchies of
holiness between religious faiths is a fruitless exercise.
It also must be recognized, however, that, as Saul Cohen points out,
"[a]t no time in the thirteen centuries of Islamic rule was Jerusalem part
of, let alone synonymous with, a national entity."3 The Umayyids in the
seventh century chose Ramie, not Jerusalem, as the administrative capital
of the country. The Ottomans ruled Palestine from Damascus. Indeed,
some twelfth century Muslim leaders were prepared to trade the city of
Jerusalem for Dammietta (now Dumyat), a then-important port on the
Egyptian coast.
The issue of Jerusalem, however, is not simply one of "sacred space."
Jerusalem is a city of the living, with housing, industry, and road and in-
frastructure needs. It is the center of government for the Jews, and the
intellectual and economic center of the Palestinian West Bank. It is a city
of 550,000 persons, comprising 400,000 Jews and 150,000 Arabs joined, as
it were, at the hip, living together separately in stippled fashion.
1. MICHAEL REISMAN, THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE: DIPLOMATIC ALTERNATIVES IN
THE MIDDLE EAST 73 (1970).
2. R.J. WERBLOWSKY, THE MEANING OF JERUSALEM To JEWS, CHRISTIANS AND
MUSLIMS 2 (Jerusalem: Israel Study Group for Middle East Affairs, 1988).
3. SAUL B. COHEN, JERUSALEM: BRIDGING THE FOUR WALLS 109 (1977).
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To make matters even more complex this "earthly Jerusalem" has be-
come a "condensation symbol" for the nationalist political aspirations of
both Israelis and Palestinians. For Israelis, whether religious or secular, it
is "Jerusalem of Gold," a united Jerusalem, the "eternal capital of Israel
now and forever." And, for their part, Palestinians find it hard to imag-
ine a Palestinian entity that does not encompass some part of Jerusalem.
These competing political aspirations create a belief among many that
Jerusalem, like the baby in the Judgment of Solomon, presents a zero-
sum problem in which, of necessity, winners must be offset by losers.
This Symposium on Jerusalem is unique in that it searches for under-
standing, not self-validation. It would have been relatively simple for the
various authors to throw down the gauntlet on behalf of an assigned or
self-assigned ethnic, religious, or nationalist "cause." Instead of advocacy
briefs, happily, this Symposium offers efforts at establishing contours for
a "middle ground" and in better understanding the sociology of the vari-
ous players in the Jerusalem entropot. Indeed, this Symposium reflects a
more mature stage in the Jerusalem debate in that if there is any bias in
these assembled papers, it is toward negotiable solutions.4
This Symposium is particularly rich in its discussion of issues related to
the Holy Places-perhaps the area of contention within Jerusalem most
amenable to resolution. The papers by Silvio Ferrari5 and Charalambos
Papastathis6 strike new ground in their review of the positions of the Ro-
man Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches respectively. Ferrari's sug-
gestion that the matter of "international guarantees,"7 so dear to the
Vatican, could be met by Israeli reaffirmation of already-established in-
ternational commitments regarding the Holy Places may well offer a sig-
nificant breakthrough in the discussion of this issue. Papastathis's
explanation of why and how Greek Orthodox perspectives differ from
those of Roman Catholics raises issues often overlooked. Menachem
Klein's study of The Islamic Holy Sites As A Political Bargaining Card
(1993-1995)8 is among the first in English to explicate "Holy Place" poli-
4. One exception is John Quigley, who argues that Israel has no legal rights in Jerusa-
lem under international law. John Quigley, Sovereignty in Jerusalem, 45 CATH. U. L. REV.
765 (1996). Whether correct or not (and there are a slew of international law scholars who
would take issue with him), Quigley's legal formalism is likely to be relegated to advocates
briefs rather than efforts at reconcilation and resolution.
5. Silvio Ferrari, The Religious Significance of Jerusalem in the Middle East Peace
Process: Some Legal Implications, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 733 (1996).
6. Charalambos K. Papastathis, A New Status for Jerusalem? An Eastern Orthodox
Viewpoint, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 723 (1996).
7. Ferrari, supra note 5, at 941-43.
8. Menachem Klein, The Islamic Holy Places as a Political Bargaining Card (1993-
1995), 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 745 (1996).
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tics within the Muslim community. Klein makes clear that stakeholders
in Jerusalem include not only the Palestinians and Jordan, but also the
Islamic Conference and King Hassan of Morocco.9 The Saudis, guardians
of Mecca and Medina, also maintain a watching brief on this third Mos-
lem holy city. These papers in no way provide a full discussion of the
religious problems involved in the "Holy Places" negotiations but they do
inform the landscape in new and valuable ways.
And, of course, Justice Menachem ELon's opinion in Temple Mount
Faithful et al. v. Attorney General et al. ,"0 with its deeply moving discus-
sion of Jewish views of the Temple Mount makes clear the attachment of
religious Jews to that holy site.1 Justice Elon's opinion suggests particu-
lar problems of overlapping "holiness."' 2 The Temple Mount, for exam-
ple, is holy to both Jews and Muslims, making resolution of this religious
problem exceedingly knotty.
The mere fact that both Israelis and Palestinians seek practical instead
of ideological solutions is itself a sign of progress. Any discussion of the
future of Jerusalem must recognize that there is a very narrow "trading
range" in which the parties can bargain. No Israeli government will give
the City back. Efforts then to prove that Israel has no "rights" in Jerusa-
lem under international law, whether correct or not, will have little if any
effect on the practical discussions over the City's future. Similarly, pro-
posals to divide the City in two are likely "non-starters." Of course, we
must recognize that the "trading range" itself is evolving as inter-commu-
nal confidence ebbs and flows. Nevertheless, possibilities meriting discus-
sion include notions of devolution of power, including decentralized
boroughs (talked up, but rarely acted upon, by former Mayor Teddy Kol-
lek' 3), some form of a Vatican solution, and the idea that an enlarged
"Greater Jerusalem" can in some way accommodate the political as well
as religious needs of both communities.
One of the most popular of the academic plans for Jerusalem is well
represented in this Symposium by John Whitbeck's contribution entitled,
9. Id. at 746, 754.
10. H.C. 4185/90 (S.Ct. Israel Sept. 23, 1993), reprinted in 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 861
(1996).
11. Id., reprinted in 45 CATH. U. L. REV., supra note 10, at 889-92.
12. Id., reprinted in 45 CATH. U. L. REV., supra note 10, at 917-20. This point is well-
developed in, ROGER FRIEDLAND AND RICHARD D. HECHT, The Politics of Sacred Place:
Jerusalem's Temple Mount/al-haram al-sharif, in SACRED PLACES AND PROFANE SPACES at
21-61 (Jamie Scott & Paul Simpson-Housley eds.) (1991).
13. See Teddy Kollek, Sharing United Jerusalem, FOREIGN AFFs., Winter 1988-89, at
156; Teddy Kollek, Jerusalem: Present and Future, 59 FOREIGN AFFs., 1041 (1981).
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The Road to Peace Starts in Jerusalem: The "Condominium" Solution.14
This approach, in Hebrew University Professor Avishai Margalit's words,
proposes a kind of "joint sovereignty over the city," seeking, "one city,
capital of two states."15 Whitbeck's Symposium paper on joint sover-
eignty or a "condominium" 16 solution provides a useful compilation of
the advantages of this approach and of historical examples of the genre.
Whitbeck argues that:
For more than seventy years, the entire Pacific nation of Vanu-
atu (formerly the New Hebrides Condominium) was under the
joint, undivided sovereignty of Britain and France. For more
than 700 years, the Principality of Andorra has been under the
joint, undivided sovereignty of French and Spanish individuals
(currently the President of France and the Bishop of Seo de
Urgel) while its administration is entrusted to an elected Gen-
eral Council.17
There is a qualitative difference, however, between proposals to in-
crease Palestinian involvement in the political process through, for exam-
ple, the devolution of power and proposals to share sovereignty in
Jerusalem. Borough system proposals might be viewed as a way to de-
volve authority to neighborhoods or as the beginning of shared
sovereignty.
Unfortunately, Whitbeck notwithstanding, efforts at shared sover-
eignty, however well intentioned, are likely to collapse into divided sover-
eignty. That is because shared sovereignty does not mean shared
authority. And like it or not, a city cannot be run by consensus. The
shared sovereignty notion is nothing more than a replay in one city of the
binational state idea fostered by Utopians like Judah Magnes before
1948. It marks a defeat for the Zionist impulses that lay behind the crea-
tion of a Jewish state. However subtle the diplomatic dance, when the
music stops, the inescapable reality remains-there cannot be two sover-
eignties in one city. Thus, negotiations on the future of Jerusalem will
almost certainly be predicated on the practical reality that Jerusalem
must remain as a united city (and as Israel's capital). Here Israeli differ-
ences with the Palestinians are most starkly evident.
One question regarding Jerusalem has been addressed only obliquely
in these papers-how to define the City's boundaries? The Jordanians
14. John V. Whitbeck, The Road to Peace Starts in Jerusalem: The "Condominium"
Solution, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 781 (1996).
15. Avishai Margalit, The Myth of Jerusalem, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS,
Dec. 19, 1991, at 61.
16. Whitbeck, supra note 14.
17. Id.
19961
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when they controlled Jerusalem had planned to stake out new municipal
boundaries but were interrupted by the 1967 war. For its part, Israel,
after its 1967 victory, dramatically enlarged the City dimensions. And
proposals for further enlargement continue to appear. Indeed, it is worth
noting that the 1947 UN proposals for internationalization had a different
geographical configuration in mind-one which enlarged the City to
achieve relative parity between the Jewish and Arab populations.
The notion of geographically "relativizing" Jerusalem adds to the pos-
sibilities for creative diplomacy. To do this, however, one needs to better
reflect on what geographical boundaries specifically encompass the holi-
ness-in Hebrew the Kedusha-of Jerusalem for Muslims, Christians,
and Jews. And similarly, what geographical boundaries symbolize their
respective nationalist aspirations. This exercise may well prove instruc-
tive to Arabs and Jews alike.
Until recently, the national Israeli consensus regarding a united Jerusa-
lem as an integral and indivisible part of Israel was hegemonic. Yielding
up any portion of Jerusalem was inconceivable. Yet, as Asher Arian has
recognized, "[p]ublic opinion in Israel on security questions ;s mallea-
ble. '' 18 Attitudes in Israel already have begun to change. Arian's 1994
survey of Israeli political attitudes indicates that only fourteen percent of
Israelis approved of the inclusion of the status of Jerusalem on the peace
talks agenda.19 Yet a 1995 Gallup poll found "[1]ess than two-thirds (65
percent) of the Israeli Jewish public voiced full support for exclusive Is-
raeli sovereignty over all of Jerusalem.",
20
Nevertheless, when a recent so-called "study" by the Jerusalem Insti-
tute for Israel Studies proposing a number of options for resolving the
status of Jerusalem was leaked to the press in March 1996, the mere fact
that an academic body was preparing reports to the government that
raised the option of some form of Palestinian sovereignty in East Jerusa-
lem created a political furor.2 At the time of writing, many of the pro-
18. ASHER ARIAN, SECURITY THREATENED: SURVEYING ISRAELI OPINION ON PEACE
AND WAR 1 (1995).
19. Asher Arian, Israeli Security and the Peace Process: Public Opinion in 1994, JCSS
MEMORANDUM No. 43 (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv Univ.), March 1994, at
11.
20. Israelis May Be More Flexible on Jerusalem Poll (Reuters, May 31, 1995), avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File; see also William Pfaff, Jerusalem's Future Will
Hinge on "Second Choices", CHI. TRIBUNE, June 12, 1995.
21. Storer H. Rowley, Furor Erupts over Report on Jerusalem: Opposition is Outraged
by Leaked Proposal for Sharing Rule with Palestinian Authority, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 20,1996,
at 4; Report on Future of Jerusalem: Israeli Think Tank Sets Out Options for Permanent
Arrangement in Jerusalem, (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 20, 1996) available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File; Report on Future of Jerusalem: Israeli Institute Sug-
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posals floated in this Symposium remain well outside the tolerance of the
Israeli public.
In a sense, one is playing for time, waiting for the constant struggle
between communal hope and communal fear to play itself out, recogniz-
ing that both the Jewish and Palestinian communities fear the other side's
ultimate intentions.22 The Israelis fear that the Palestinians adhere to a
"salami strategy" in which their protestations of peace will cause Israel,
to give up strategic advantage (e.g. land) thus allowing her in a weakend
state, to be dismembered, slice by slice. For their part, the Palestinians
fear that their views of Israeli imperialism will force them into the
equivalent of Middle Eastern Bantustans.
The example of Trieste reminds us that time can be a palliative. After
World War II, Trieste was organized as a free state, or in United Nations
language, a corpus separatum. In 1954, Britain and the United States ne-
gotiated the London Agreement, a resolution of the Trieste dispute which
awarded the city itself to Italy and divided some of the outlying area (a
so-called Zone A and Zone B) between Italy and Yugoslavia. In this
resolution, "[n]either Italy nor Yugoslavia formally renounced its claims
to the Free Territory. For the Great Powers, however, the territorial set-
tlement was final."23 While the Yugoslavs "preferred to look at the
London Agreement as a final accord, the Italian legal experts underlined
its provisional character."24 In particular, it never referred to the imposi-
tion of Yugoslav or Italian sovereignty over the disputed zones. This was
because Italian public opinion in particular would not accept forfeiture of
their sacred land. Some twenty years later, however, then Council on
gests Extending Palestinian Autonomy to Holy Sites, (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Mar. 20, 1996) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
22. With his usual pithiness, Samuel Lewis notes that "if diplomats and politicians
could only place the word, 'sovereignty,' in a deep freeze somewhere for several decades, a
workable and politically acceptable arrangement for the Holy City would become infinitely
more achievable." Samuel W. Lewis, Reflections on the Future of Jerusalem, 45 CATH. U.
L. REV. 695 (1996).
23. BOGDAN C. NOVAK, TRIESTE, 1941-1954: THE ETHNIC, POLITICAL, AND IDEOLOG-
ICAL STRUGGLE 460 (1970).
24. Id. at 463. Thus, the British negotiator Sir Geoffrey Harrison has pointed out:
The Yugoslavs wanted it to be a final settlement, but we knew that this would be
quite unacceptable to the Italians; that any solution we took to the Italians which
suggested that the solution would be final would not stand a chance of accept-
ance. So I think we did devise a formula in the end which worked, which was that
the U.S. government and Her Majesty's government would not support any fur-
ther claims by either side in the area, and this satisfied the Yugoslavs and was
acceptable to the Italians. There were doors and windows left open for the fu-
ture, of course, but no matter.
SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION: TRIESTE 1954, at 52 (John C. Campbell ed., 1976) (quoting Sir
Geoffrey Harrison) (discussing his participation in the Trieste negotiations).
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Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in a conference in Helsinki
July 30-August 1, 1975 proposed a treaty to resolve the border dispute.
This took less than three months to negotiate.25
Ruth Lapidoth's extraordinary contribution to discussion of the future
of Jerusalem is the wisdom that the focus on the emotive language of
sovereignty leads only, in Moshe Hirsch's terms, to "zero-sum games" in
which one side wins and another side loses.26 Far more useful is the effort
to devise areas where one community can, in a functional manner, exer-
cise power and control over aspects of their lives in ways that do not force
a stark resolution of the sovereignty question. Thus, Lapidoth asks us to
think through the implications of what she calls "functional sovereignty"
and "suspended sovereignty" in treating Jerusalem's future.27 The con-
tributors to this Symposium point the way toward developing the kind of
innovative approaches that meet both Israeli needs and Arab
sensibilities.
As a student at Oxford some years ago, I prepared a weekly tutorial
paper on private property rights for the great legal philosopher, Professor
H.L.A. Hart. He returned my manuscript with the underlined comment
that property is a bundle of rights. This is particularly true of the notion
of sovereignty. We should recall that the concept of sovereignty is a west-
ern import into the Middle East, where for centuries the Ottoman admin-
istrative structure provided significant religious minorities with religious
and cultural autonomy through the millet system. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, citizens of western countries retained numerous special communal
privileges under various capitulation agreements. For centuries, the
Mammaluke Emirs ruled Egypt under the nominal suzerainty of the Sub-
lime Porte. Indeed, until the centralizing efforts of the Young Turks in
the last years of the empire, in much of the Ottoman lands the Sultan
ruled largely through his annual claim of tribute. For the rest of the year
the Local Governor held sway. It will take such creative expressions of
the concept of sovereignty to proffer solace to those who seek the "peace
of Jerusalem."
25. LEONARD UNGER & KRISTINA EGUUA, THE TRIESTE NEGOTIATIONS 39 (1990);
Italy and Yugoslavia Sign Accord on Trieste Region, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1975, at 34.
26. Moshe Hirsch, The Future Negotiations Over Jerusalem, Strategical Factors and
Game Theory, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 699 (1996).
27. Ruth Lapidoth, Jerusalem-Some Jurisprudential Asspects, 45 CATH. U. L. REV.
661 (1996).
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